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Abstract 
Although frequently ignored, New Zealand’s democratically-elected, subnational bodies 
provide many of the day-to-day services we rely upon, from water and sewerage to healthcare 
and education. However, the broad discretion enjoyed by ministers responsible for local 
government, District Health Boards, school boards of trustees and tertiary institution councils 
means elected representatives could easily be removed with little justification. This paper 
reviews the ministerial intervention regimes for each of these bodies and concludes that a 
principled approach to their use is needed to protect democratic values and prevent a 
concentration of power with the ministers. It suggests democracy, subsidiarity, the scale of the 
problem, the importance/centrality of the function, timing, complexity, transparency, 
consultation, apolitical decision-making and minimising interventions as principles upon 
which to critically analyse past interventions and ensure these powers are used more effectively 
in future. 
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I Introduction 
Democracy is traditionally considered “government of the people, by the people, for the 
people”.1 This apparent unity of purpose and membership belies the tension between elected 
ministers and other entities whose democratic legitimacy comes from subsets of the wider 
populace. Such democratic subnational bodies provide indispensable day-to-day services. 
Eighty-six local authorities control our water and sewerage.2 Twenty District Health Boards 
(DHBs) manage our hospitals.3 Over 2500 boards of trustees govern our primary and secondary 
schools, while partially-elected councils control eight universities, eighteen polytechnics and 
other tertiary education providers.4 These bodies permit community input rather than a ‘one 
size fits all’ approach. However, ministerial intervention jeopardises this by displacing locally 
elected representatives.  
This paper argues that current intervention regimes afford ministers too much discretion, 
potentially harming local democracy, and seeks a principled approach for their future use. Parts 
II to V examine intervention regimes for local government, DHBs, boards of trustees and 
tertiary institution councils. Each is considered using three dimensions: the theoretical (the 
statutory context and formulation of each regime), the practical (examining the effectiveness 
and justifiability of previous interventions through case studies) and, briefly, the other options 
for ensuring accountability. Part VI then derives principles transcending and uniting these 
regimes to encourage better application of ministerial intervention powers. These include 
higher level concerns like the democratic nature of the body and the principle of subsidiarity, 
as well as scenario-specific matters, including the scale of the particular problem and the 
importance of the function concerned. 
II Local Government  
In this Part, I examine the alarming breadth of ministerial discretion to intervene extensively 
in local government. While interventions remain rare, their prevalence is increasing, prompting 
criticism under learning, constitutional, and most importantly, democratic perspectives. A 
willingness to replace elected authorities inhibits learning and discourages council decision-
making, while risking a concentration of power with the minister. It also deprives communities 
                                               
1 Abraham Lincoln “The Gettysburg Address” (Dedication of the Soldiers’ National Cemetery, Gettysburg, 19 
November 1863). 
2 Department of Internal Affairs “About local government” <www.localcouncils.govt.nz>. 
3 Ministry of Health “District health boards” (14 January 2014) <www.health.govt.nz>. 
4 NZQA “ITPs in New Zealand” (<www.nzqa.govt.nz>). 
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of their representatives, who are elected specifically to ensure decisions take account of local 
conditions. 
A The statutory regime  
The original Local Government Act 1989 replaced 800 single and multi-purpose entities with 
78 regional councils and territorial authorities.5 Regional councils manage “natural and 
physical resources”, water supply, discharges into/onto water, air or land, flood protection and 
natural hazards.6 Territorial authorities are city or district councils, responsible for controlling 
land use and development, protecting public health and safety and providing infrastructure 
including sewerage, roads and water.7 As well as the Local Government Act 2002 (LGA), such 
authorities are subject to the Local Government (Rating) Act 2002 and Local Electoral Act 
2001.  
Since local authorities manage $100 billion of public assets, spending 4% of New Zealand’s 
GDP ($7.5 billion) annually, central government has, unsurprisingly, refused to relinquish 
control entirely.8 The 2012 amendments to the LGA Part 10 gave the Minister of Local 
Government additional powers to assist local authorities and “intervene in [their] affairs… in 
certain situations”.9  
While each intervention option has particular prerequisites, all necessitate either a “problem” 
or a “significant problem”. A problem requires a current or potential issue reducing the 
authority’s ability to implement the purposes of local government or “a significant or persistent 
failure” to perform statutory duties.10 This may include “[im]prudent management of … 
revenues, expenses, assets, liabilities, investments, or general financial dealings”.11 A 
significant problem further requires “actual or probable adverse consequences for residents”.12 
Including “potential” issues widens the definition immensely, while “significant” adds little 
                                               
5 These together make up local authorities under the Local Government Act 2002, s 5; Peter McKinlay “Future 
of Local Government Summit: A New Zealand Perspective” (paper presented to the Local Government Centre, 
Auckland) at 1 and 2. 
6 Local Government Act, s 149(1); Resource Management Act 1991, s 30. 
7 Resource Management Act, s 31, Local Government Act, ss 5 and 146. 
8 (12 June 2012) 680 NZPD 2839. 
9 Local Government Act, s 253. The 2012 amendment also made other significant changes including the 
removal of the four well-beings, however these are beyond the scope of this paper. 
10 The civil emergencies aspect of ministerial powers will not be examined in this paper; Local Government Act, 
s 256. 
11 Section 256 (b)(i). 
12 Section 256. 
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since situations constituting “problems” will virtually always have “probable adverse 
consequences”. 
The purposes of local government are enabling local democracy and providing “good-quality 
local infrastructure,…public services, and performance of regulatory functions” in the “most 
cost-effective [way] for households and businesses”.13 Good-quality is further defined as 
“efficient, effective and appropriate to present and anticipated future circumstances”.14 Thus, 
failing to get value for money may permit intervention. 
The Minister has six intervention options. These are: 
 requiring information,15 
 appointing a Crown Review Team (CRT),16 
 appointing a Crown observer,17 
 appointing a Crown manager,18 
 appointing a commission,19 and 
 calling or postponing a general election.20 
These appear hierarchical, from minor monitoring to major intervention.21 A Minister can 
require information as to the problem’s nature and plans to address it.22 Alternatively, a CRT 
can independently assess problems and recommend action to the minister or authority.23 Crown 
observers assist in addressing problems, monitor progress and make further recommendations 
to the Minister, while a Crown manager may also direct the local authority in addressing the 
problem.24 Appointing a commission to take over the local authority’s functions and powers, 
with councillors remaining in office in name only, is the most invasive option.25 Calling a 
                                               
13 Section 10. 
14 Section 10(2). 
15 Section 257. 
16 Section 258. 
17 Section 258B. 
18 Section 258D. 
19 Section 258F. 
20 Section 258M. 
21 New Zealand Treasury Regulatory Impact Statement – Better Local Government (March 2012) at [184]. 
22 Local Government Act, 257(1). 
23 Section 258(4). 
24 Sections 258B(4) and 258D(4). 
25 Sections 258F and 258K. 
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general election allows a fresh start.26 While the council must pay appointees’ fees, they are 
responsible only to the minister.27  
 
                                               
26 Section 258M(1). 
27 Sections 258W and 258Y. 
Diagram 1:Ministerial intervention powers for local government 
9           For the people, by the minister: ministerial interventions in subnational, elected bodies and a principled approach to their future application 
 
 
 
A Minister may also intervene upon request from the local authority or a pre-existing appointed 
body.28 
Despite this hierarchy of intervention options, there is no equivalent hierarchy of thresholds for 
their use. Instead, the Department of Internal Affairs (DIA) considers Part 10 a “menu”, 
implying free choice based on personal preference, which appears accurate.29 For example, a 
local authority hesitating to act upon recommendations may face a CRT if considered unwilling 
to address the problem, or a more invasive Crown manager for failing to implement 
recommendations.30  
Particularly concerning is the number of discretionary decisions involved. A Crown observer 
or manager’s availability is based purely upon a Minister’s view of the situation, while the less 
powerful CRT requires that the authority be unable/unwilling to act, which is quantitatively 
ascertainable.31 Furthermore, most criteria for appointing a commission, and thus displacing 
elected representatives entirely, require only ministerial judgment.32 The regime also allows 
punitive action against local authorities. An authority failing to do as recommended risks a 
Crown manager’s appointment; not responding to requests for information within the 
Minister’s chosen timeframe may prompt a CRT.33  
Ministers must issue a list of factors which might influence intervention decisions.34 The 
guiding principles published in 2013 included transparency, that local authorities should 
resolve their own issues and that assistance should be proportionate to the problem’s nature 
and potential consequences. Matters identified as “likely to detract” from local authorities’ 
capacity to meet the purposes of local government are listed as “financial mismanagement”, 
relationship breakdowns, “serious capability deficiencies of elected members” and 
dysfunctional governance.35 While the published list is extensive, the Minister may consider 
non-listed factors. 
                                               
28 Sections 257, 258, 258B, 258D, 258F and 258M. 
29 Department of Internal Affairs “Implementing the 2012 Amendment Act” <www.dia.govt.nz>. This concurs 
with the Local Government Act, s 254(4). 
30 Local Government Act, ss 257 and 258D. 
31 Sections 258B and 258D. 
32 Section 258. 
33 Sections 257 and 258F. 
34 Section 258O. 
35 “Notice Regarding Ministerial Powers of Assistance and Intervention” (28 March 2013) 38 New Zealand 
Gazette 1111 at 1140. 
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The present provisions significantly tightened local government’s leash. Pre-2012, a Review 
Authority was required before further intervention, delaying matters significantly.36 Even 
convening that authority required a significant or persistent failure to meet obligations or 
“significant and identifiable” mismanagement (potential problems, now capable of triggering 
much greater intervention, were insufficient).37 Once a Review Authority reported, the Minister 
could appoint a commission or call an election, but only if the reviewers recommended it, the 
local authority requested it or could not hold meetings due to lack of a quorum.38 Alternatively, 
an appointee could perform obligations in place of local authorities “wilfully refusing or 
substantially refusing” to act and thus impairing local government or endangering public 
health.39 Such high thresholds meant provisions were often circumnavigated.40 
The arguments for and against amending the LGA are instructive as regards its future 
application. The Bill’s supporters focused on financial concerns, citing rates increasing 6.8% 
and debt increasing from $2 billion to $8 billion.41 Reform was needed to encourage “fiscal 
responsibility”, competition and productivity.42 Treasury suggested that a lack of intervention 
powers was contributing to rates increases,43 despite evidence that existing powers were seldom 
needed, councils did not require assistance and other statutes already permitted limited 
interventions.44 There were also concerns to reduce “excessive costs and time delays” and stop 
local government’s perceived expansion. Maggie Barry MP argued that:45  
Councils need to be pulled back into line... Councils need to be kept under control... 
Government does the governing, local authorities deliver the services… 
Such concerns apparently triumphed, with ministerial powers broadened by Supplementary 
Order Paper to allow intervention without demonstrable financial mismanagement. The DIA 
considered the amendments “a shift from a reactive, significant response to a proactive and 
graduated approach”, despite their enabling far more drastic and immediate action. 
Labour’s objections to the Bill included the lack of evidence of financial irresponsibility by 
local authorities, with an independent report showing spending levels were ensuring a “long-
                                               
36 Local Government Act, s 254(2) (repealed). 
37 Section 254(2) (repealed). 
38 Section 255 (repealed) and sch 15 cl 14 (repealed). 
39 Section 256 (repealed). 
40 See Part I.B. 
41 (12 June 2012) 680 NZPD 2843. 
42 New Zealand Treasury, Regulatory Impact Statement – Better Local Government, above n 21, at 7. 
43 At 7. 
44 At 7 and 22.  
45 (12 June 2012) 680 NZPD 2858. 
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lived asset base”.46 Rather than arguing that local government expansion was legitimate, MPs 
claimed it had not occurred, perhaps suggesting a preference for limited local government.47 
The Greens concentrated on the democratic implications of shifting power away from 
communities, in what they considered a “major constitutional change”.48 The lack of 
consultation obligations and the “subjectivity” the Bill introduced were also criticised.49 New 
Zealand First considered it a “central government power grab”.50 
The Bill’s Select Committee received 775 submissions.51 The Auckland District Law Society 
called the Part 10 proposals “constitutionally untenable” in light of “the notion of a separate 
institution of local government”.52 Many submissions echoed this concern for democracy,53 
and fear of ministers misusing power.54 Submitters also believed that existing processes, like 
annual audits, afforded local government enough support and the local government sector or 
independent agencies could accommodate any additional needs.55 Local government processes 
might also stagnate if councillors were constantly looking over their shoulders.56 Other 
submitters denied reform was necessary; local government was acting as required by balancing 
central government power.57 
Thus, there was significant opposition to the Government’s extending intervention powers in 
local government. However, it is the level of discretion the amendments afford that is most 
concerning, particularly since the case studies below reveal a willingness to use these powers 
in the interests of politics, rather than the community. 
B Interventions in practice 
Past usage of intervention powers may inform speculation as to future uses. While it should be 
noted that only Christchurch City Council’s Crown manager was appointed under the current 
                                               
46 NZIER Is local government fiscally responsible? NZIER report to Local Government New Zealand (11 
September 2012) at i and 12. 
47 Local Government Act 2002 Amendment bill (27-2) (select committee report) at 9-10. 
48 At 15-16.  
49 (12 June 2012) 680 NZPD 2848. 
50 Local Government Act 2002 Amendment bill (27-2) (select committee report) at 20. 
51 At 17. 
52 Auckland District Law Society “Local Government Act 2002 Amendment Bill” at [43]. 
53 For example, Human Rights Commission “Submission on the Local Government Act 2002 Amendment Bill” 
at [2.16]. 
54 At 4.7 and Kapiti Coast District Council “Kapiti Coast District Council Submission on Local Government Act 
Amendment Bill” at 7-8. 
55 Human Rights Commission, above n 53, at 4.8. 
56 New Zealand Public Service Association “Local Government Act 2002 Amendment Bill Submission of the 
New Zealand Public Service Association Te Pukenga Here Tikanga Mahi to the Local Government and 
Environment Select committee” at 11. 
57 At 5. 
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regime, earlier interventions remain informative. Since the present statute is even more 
permissive of ministerial intervention, it seems likely that similar, if not more stringent, action 
would have been taken under its provisions. These previous interventions, while few in 
number, reveal a somewhat inconsistent approach to utilising the LGA powers. Furthermore, 
that four out of five have occurred in the last five years suggests ministers are increasingly 
willing to displace elected councils. 
1 Christchurch City Council  
In 2012, Christchurch City Council requested a Crown observer to assist with post-earthquake 
“governance issues”,58 following public anger at the chief executive’s $68,000 pay rise and 
“quite destructive” council leaks and squabbles.59 The observer would offer advice, develop a 
council charter and report to the minister.60 Should issues remain unresolved within “weeks, 
not months”, a commission would be appointed.61 The observer’s appointment preceded the 
LGA’s 2012 amendments and had no statutory basis. An organisation calling itself ‘Council 
Watch’ requested that the Ombudsman and Crown Law investigate the appointment’s legality 
since local government is “constituted separate from central government under an Act of 
Parliament for a reason”.62 It considered the move a subversion of democracy and the principle 
that taxation requires representation.63  
The observer, Kerry Marshall, identified a “breakdown in trust and the blurring of the line 
between governance and management", which had been exacerbated by councillors publicly 
criticising staff members.64 However, progress was made and his contract ended on 1 July 
2012.65 
The following July, International Accreditation New Zealand revoked Christchurch City 
Council’s Building Consent Authority status following prolonged “compliance and 
performance issues” in terms of speed and quality, prompting the council to request a Crown 
                                               
58 Department of Internal Affairs “Summary of Crown Observer Proposal” <www.beehive.govt.nz>.  
59 Ben Heather “Council observer to meet councillors” The Press (online ed, Christchurch, 30 January 2012); 
Sam Sachdeva “Government observer appointed to council” The Press (online ed, Christchuch, 28 January 
2012).  
60 Nick Smith “Crown Observer to assist ChCh City Council” (press release, 27 January 2012). 
61 Sachdeva, above n 59. 
62 Council Watch “Crown Law Asked to Investigate Minister’s Decision” (press release, 30 January 2012). 
63 Council Watch, above n 62. 
64 Rachel Young “Contract for council’s Crown observer to end” The Press (online ed, Christchurch, 26 June 
2012). 
65 Sam Sachdeva “Crown observer should stay until election” The Press (online ed, Christchurch, 2 June 2012). 
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manager under the LGA.66 Labour’s attempt to urgently debate the matter in the House was 
rejected since the outcome of the government’s actions was not yet clear.67 Doug Martin, 
formerly Jenny Shipley’s chief of staff, was appointed Crown manager, to oversee the council’s 
building control functions and ensure it regained accreditation.68 His initial review identified a 
“lack of a clear point of accountability”, leadership problems, inadequate resourcing and 
cultural issues.69  
Christchurch City Council reapplied for accreditation in May 2014, with preliminary findings 
approving the cultural change but cautioning that modifications were “very recent” with some 
processes only “partially implemented”.70 By November, most issues had been resolved.71 The 
Crown manager’s contract expired on 31 December 2014. His tenure has been controversial, 
running up $9 million in “unexpected costs”.72 His appointment is the only intervention under 
the current regime. 
2 Kaipara District Council  
Problems arose in Kaipara when Kaipara District Council undertook a public-private 
partnership rather than paying outright for the Mangawhai wastewater scheme, but lacked the 
skills to implement it effectively.73 The resulting $85.2 million debt blowout rendered it New 
Zealand’s most indebted council per capita and ratepayers revolted over proposed 31% rates 
increases.74  
Kaipara District Council invited the Minister to appoint a Review Team (circumventing the 
LGA’s provisions on appointing a Review Authority). Their report found the council unable to 
rectify problems and catalysing the rates strike.75   A “failure of governance” had broken the 
                                               
66 APNZ “Chch consents crisis: Crown manager to be appointed” The New Zealand Herald (online ed, 
Auckland, 4 July 2013); “Notice of Intention to Appoint a Crown Manager Pursuant to Section 258D(1)(b)” (11 
July 2013) 88 New Zealand Gazette 2354. 
67 (9 July 2013) 692 NZPD 11774. 
68 “Notice of Intention to Appoint a Crown Manager Pursuant to Section 258D(1)(b)”, above n 66. 
69 Doug Martin Monthly Progress Report of the Crown manager to the Christchurch City Council (6 September 
2013) at [32]-[33]. 
70 IANZ Building Consent Authority Accreditation Assessment Report (17 November 2014) at 3. 
71 At 3. 
72 Lois Cairns “Consents rights bid cost council $9m” The Press (online ed, Christchurch, 2 July 2014). 
73 Office of the Auditor-General Inquiry into the Mangawhai community wastewater scheme (November 2013) 
at [2.7] and [4.42]. 
74 John Hartevelt and Nick Unkovich “Commissioners installed in Kaipara” The Dominion Post (online ed, 
Wellington, 13 August 2012). 
75 Greg Gent, Leigh Auton and Peter Tennent Report of the Kaipara District Council Review Team (17 August 
2012) at [25]-[26], [30]-[31] and [50]-[51]; Office of the Auditor-General Inquiry into the Mangawhai 
community wastewater scheme, above n 73, at 10. 
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community’s trust and commissioners were needed to enable a cultural shift.76 An Auditor-
General’s report also found that Kaipara District Council had failed in “its fundamental legal 
and accountability obligations” and “effectively lost control of a major infrastructure 
project”.77 Management was so poor that the council’s losses could not be calculated, the best 
estimate being $63.3 million.78  
Kaipara District Council consented to commissioners being appointed to enforce rates, address 
illegal rates, review financial strategies and work with the community.79 The Kaipara District 
Council (Validation of Rates and Other Matters) Act 2013 passed with cross-party support, 
legalising rates the High Court had ruled illegitimate.80  The commissioners have subsequently 
issued summons to 300 rates “strikers” and added arrears to 200 mortgages.81  
3 Environment Canterbury (Canterbury Regional Council, ECan) 
In September 2009, ten Canterbury mayors complained to then-Minister of Local Government, 
Rodney Hide, of slow consent processes and fractious relationships with ECan.82 Hide 
commissioned a wide-ranging review of ECan’s operations, headed by the Rt Hon Wyatt 
Creech (Jenny Shipley’s deputy Prime Minister).83 Since the DIA was concerned that the high 
threshold for convening a Review Authority had not been met, this was not an LGA review. 
RMA review powers were however exercised.84  
The report found major flaws in ECan’s water consenting processes, concluding that 
Canterbury’s water management was too complex to entrust to a regional council.85 Central 
government intervention was needed to address this “single most significant issue facing the 
Canterbury Region”.86 ECan was only processing 29% of consents on time, the least of 84 
                                               
76 Gent, Auton and Tennent, above n 75, at [2]-[3]. 
77 Office of the Auditor-General Inquiry into the Mangawhai community wastewater scheme, above n 73, at 9. 
78 At 10. 
79 “Appointment of Commissioners of the Kaipara District Council” (31 August 2012) 110 New Zealand 
Gazette 3155; David Carter “Kaipara Council commissioners appointed” (press release, 29 August 2012). 
80 Kaipara District Council “Kaipara Commissioners reject MRRA rates exemption” (press release, 4 October 
2013); Mangawhai Ratepayers’ and Residents’ Association Inc v Kaipara District Council [2013] NZHC 2220. 
81 Rob Stock “Council targets 500 rates rebels” The Dominion Post (online ed, Wellington, 23 November 2014). 
82 Environment Canterbury “Mayors’ letter to Minister out of left field” (press release, 23 September 2009); 
Paul Gorman “Environment Canterbury’s work under the gun” The Dominion Post (online ed, Wellington 29 
October 2009). 
83 Nick Smith and Rodney Hide “Govt announces Environment Canterbury review team” (press release, 16 
November 2009). 
84 Department of Internal Affairs “Powers and Process for Ministerial Intervention in a local authority under the 
Local Government Act 2002” (14 September 2009) at [17]; Ministry for the Environment “Investigation of 
Environment Canterbury” (17 September 2009). 
85 Wyatt Creech, MartinJenkins, Greg Hill and Morrison Low Investigation of the Performance of Environment 
Canterbury under the Resource Management Act and Local Government Act (February 2010) at i and 7. 
86 At i, 4, and 5. 
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authorities, and were 18 years late in implementing a regional plan.87 The reviewers also 
criticised its single-minded focus on environmental protection and “we know best attitude”.88  
This said, they found that ECan was meeting all other LGA obligations; its major problem was 
its interpretation of the RMA, and it was making progress.89 
The report recommended a specialist Canterbury Regional Water Authority be created by 
legislation, since neither the LGA nor RMA’s options were workable.90 In the interim, a 
temporary commission should replace ECan’s water consent division “as soon as practicable”, 
with elections restored by 2013.91 Functions other than water consenting should remain with 
ECan. By contrast, the DIA recommended against a separate water authority as it reduced the 
Government’s options regarding “planned work on local government structure”.92 However, it 
now considered that the LGA’s high threshold for intervention was met, despite the Creech 
report’s uncertainty in this regard.93 
Rather than worry about meeting intervention criteria, the Government passed the Environment 
Canterbury (Temporary Commissioners and Improved Water Management) Act 2010 (ECan 
Act) under urgency, citing Canterbury’s need for a quick resolution to the uncertainty.94 Elected 
members were replaced by appointed commissioners and elections were suspended until 2013 
then further postponed until 2016, with a review of governance options expected in December 
2014.95 The Minister gained full discretion over commissioners’ appointments, payment and 
terms of reference, while regulations could temporarily suspend the RMA’s operation in 
Canterbury.96 Part 9, dealing with water conservation, was suspended indefinitely.97 The 
Environment Court’s jurisdiction was removed; only points of law could be appealed to the 
                                               
87 At 6 and 25. 
88 At 10 and 26. 
89 At 50. 
90 At 22 and 11. 
91 At iv, v, 12 and 17. 
92 Department of Internal Affairs “Implications of appointing commissioners to Environment Canterbury” (12 
February 2010). 
93 Creech, MartinJenkins, Hill and Morrison Low, above n 85, at 18. 
94 Department of Internal Affairs “Aide memoire for Cabinet paper “Response to Review of Environment 
Canterbury” (5 March 2010) at 3. 
95 Environment Canterbury (Temporary Commissioners and Improved Water Management) Act 2010, ss 10 and 
22 as amended by the Environment Canterbury (Temporary Commissioners and Improved Water Management) 
Amendment Act 2013. As of February 2015, no such report on ECan’s governance has been released. 
96 Sections 10, 13, 17 and 18. 
97 Sections 20, 31 and 46.  
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High Court.98 The Minister could also permit the suspension of any application, without 
compensation.99  
Opposition MPs roundly criticised the ECan Act as disenfranchising voters.100 Professor Philip 
Joseph considered the “disproportionate and excessive” suspension of local democracy to have 
“menacing implications” and was particularly troubled by its extension beyond the three year 
Parliamentary term.101 He also criticised the specific targeting of the Hurunui water 
conservation order application, the Act’s retrospective provisions and the exclusion of the 
Environment Court as breaching the “fundamentals of a civilised society under the rule of 
law”.102 Section 31 was a Henry VIII clause, allowing regulations to override primary 
legislation.103 
4 Rodney District Council  
In 1999, Rodney District Council imploded. The mayor struggled to control meetings as 
councillors bandied profanities and openly criticised decisions.104 Standing orders and codes 
of conduct were ignored.105  
Rodney District Council unanimously requested a Review Authority in October 1999.106  
Following sixty hours of submissions, that authority labelled the Council “clearly 
dysfunctional” and incapable of the “urgent action… needed to enable it to become a cohesive 
political entity.”107 While financial management was adequate, governance issues required 
immediate resolution to prevent “adverse social, economic and environmental impacts”.108 
While the authority would have preferred the Council to be independently monitored, the then 
LGA did not permit this, so it recommended a temporary commission.109 Local Government 
New Zealand and the Auditor-General supported this conclusion.110 A commissioner held 
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99 Sections 34 and 44. 
100 (30 March 2010) 661 NZPD 9935. 
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office from April 2000 until the following March’s elections. The Local Government (Rodney 
District Council) Amendment Act 2000, clarifying the commissioner’s role, received cross-
party support.111 
5 Waitomo District Council  
A 2006 audit of Waitomo District Council’s proposed Long Term Council Community Plan 
labelled it “financially [im]prudent”.112 Forecasted surpluses ignored ageing infrastructure and 
low rate levels,113 while planned debt increases from $29.1 million to $69.1 million and 66% 
rates increases over 10 years were unsustainable.114 Since LGA thresholds for intervention 
were not met, informal action was taken. Waitomo District Council agreed to the Minister 
appointing an expert panel to advise the Council on its financial performance and infrastructure 
management.115 
6 Critiquing the intervention regime’s application 
Previous interventions have been somewhat inconsistent. Christchurch City Council received 
only a Crown manager having failed in a core function (building consents), while ECan’s water 
consenting failures resulted in its dismissal, generating accusations of political manoeuvring. 
It is also unclear as to why Christchurch City Council initially received a Crown observer when 
bickering between councillors and ratepayers’ outrage at officials’ pay rises are an ordinary 
part of democracy. 
Ultimately, the intervention regime aims to prevent misuse of subnational power by holding 
local authorities accountable and allowing the minister to act if necessary. Its efficacy can be 
considered using Bovens’ framework for assessing accountability.116 Bovens defines 
accountability as:117 
a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain and 
to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgment, and the actor 
may face consequences. 
                                               
111 (2 May 2000) 596 NZPD 2648. 
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113 At 7.64. 
114 At 7.66 and 7.67. 
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117 At 450. 
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Here, the relevant actor is the local council, the forum is the minister. This enshrines a 
hierarchical accountability model repeated in the other regimes examined (a horizontal 
accountability model might give greater power to assist to other organisations within the local 
government sphere including Local Government New Zealand).118 The only thing lacking is 
the ability for the council to explain or justify their decisions, in the absence of a consultation 
requirement, but a minister would be well-advised to undertake such consultation anyway.119  
In considering accountability, Bovens suggests analysing three perspectives. The democratic 
perspective asks whether there is a link to the electorate to legitimise the use of power.120 The 
constitutional perspective is critical of any attempt to centralise power as this may lead to 
corruption.121 Finally, the learning perspective assesses the capacity of public bodies to learn 
from their mistakes through feedback and reflectivity.122 
Regarding the democratic perspective, both the local council and the minister, and thus his/her 
appointees, have democratic legitimacy, through local body and central government elections 
respectively. However, the principle of subsidiarity suggests that decisions should be taken as 
locally as possible, and indeed, local government’s proximity to the people arguably grants it 
greater democratic legitimacy.123 It also better accommodates New Zealand’s heterogeneity 
than central government.124 
However, going one step further and examining the strength of the democratic link reveals 
local democracy to be somewhat problematic. Local government may still not represent diverse 
interests within constituencies.125 Low election turnouts (approximately 40%) allegedly 
diminish its democratic legitimacy, despite choosing not to vote arguably being a democratic 
prerogative.126 Younger residents overwhelmingly fail to vote (34% of 18-29 year olds voted 
in the 2001 local government elections compared to over 80% of over 50s).127 That Regional 
Councils in particular often appear to be mere providers of technical services rather than an 
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“instrument of democratic will” is perhaps off-putting for voters.128 However, local democracy 
is not just about voter turnout, but also residents’ rights to stand for election and the high 
turnover of local candidates keeps councils sensitive to community concerns.129 
Studies also show “little clear evidence that policies and expenditure are influenced by voting 
at local elections” as non-elected officials are primarily responsible for policy-making and 
daily administration.130 Councils also tend to act consistently with the government’s wishes 
and override community views, producing little regional variation.131 Thus, local democracy 
has little impact. Indeed, some have suggested this is preferable, since those not concerned with 
re-election can make difficult decisions without fear.132 However, allowing ministers such wide 
powers to intervene may actually worsen local government’s democracy problems by making 
it appear to be merely a central government agent. 
Considering the constitutional perspective, the intervention regime for local government may 
be of concern as the Minister could easily remove a council’s power and grant it to ministerial 
appointees over a minor matter. Even appointing a Crown observer or CRT might influence 
behaviour. Indeed, simply the threat of being overtaken by a commission at the minister’s 
behest might ‘encourage’ councils to fall into line or at least, cause decision-making to stagnate 
as authorities constantly look over their shoulders. However, there having been only five 
official interventions in fifteen years belies this. Then again, four of those interventions 
occurred in the last five years, suggesting such activity may be increasing. 
Regarding the learning perspective, the current local government regime provides for Crown 
observers to assist councils rather than simply taking over their powers. However, this 
presupposes that a Crown observer will be used before a Crown manager or commission, 
whereas, at present, these seem to be used as discrete options. There is also no consultation 
mechanism to enhance communication between the minister and council.  
C Other accountability mechanisms 
For completeness, both the RMA and Building Act 2004 grant their respective ministers power 
to intervene in local authorities’ affairs, prompting arguments that Part 10’s wide-ranging 
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powers are unnecessary. In addition to broad attempts to influence councils through 
regulations, national environmental standards or national policy statements,133 the RMA allows 
the Environment Minister to investigate authorities failing to perform their duties and make 
recommendations on exercising their powers.134 Failure to implement recommendations may 
result in appointees acting in their stead.135 A local authority may also be directed to create or 
change its regional or district plan.136 Similarly, the responsible minister, in consultation with 
the Local Government minister, can, under the Building Act 2004, appoint individuals to 
perform the local authority’s functions.137 However, this provision has never been used and 
these limited powers will not be discussed further.138 
Other actors who affect local government include the Local Government Commission which 
can inquire into reorganisation proposals;139 the Auditor-General who is responsible for 
auditing local authorities and their long-term plans140 and the Ombudsman.141 
D Summary 
The current intervention regime for local authorities gives ministers very broad discretion, 
which is increasingly being used. This raises concerns regarding the potential concentration of 
power with the Minister, stagnation of local government processes and the appropriateness of 
replacing locally-elected representatives with ministerial appointees. 
III District Health Boards 
The intervention regime for DHBs includes fewer options (three compared to the six for local 
government), but grants the minister far wider discretion to intervene, as there need not be a 
specific problem, merely room for improvement. However, factors such as DHBs being 
partially minister-appointed arguably legitimise such interventions, despite there being greater 
scope for misuse. 
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A The statutory regime 
The New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act 2000 replaced earlier, more centralised and 
more commercial models of healthcare provision with twenty-one (now twenty) DHBs.142 
Together they spend over $10 billion annually, approximately three-quarters of healthcare 
funding.143 Wielding budgets of over $1 billion per annum, some rank among the country’s 
biggest entities.144  
DHBs comprise up to eleven members.145 Seven members are elected during local body 
elections, while the Minister of Health has discretion to appoint (and subsequently dismiss) up 
to four more, as well as the chair and deputy chair.146 These appointments must encourage 
proportional Maori membership; each DHB requires at least two Maori members.147 The 
Board’s elected members assist in “provid[ing] a community voice” regarding health services, 
one of the Act’s stated purposes.148 
DHBs’ objectives and functions include “to improve, promote, and protect the health of people 
and communities”; to “seek the optimum arrangement” to effectively and efficiently deliver 
health services; to reduce disparities in health outcomes between population groups and 
encourage community participation.149 In practical terms, they are responsible for New 
Zealand’s primary healthcare and hospitals, making strategic decisions and monitoring 
finances and service provision.150 
DHBs are Crown agents, so must comply with government policy as directed by the Minister 
of Health.151 Ministers of State Services and Finance may also jointly implement specific 
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requirements as part of a “whole of government approach” where necessary to “secure 
economies or efficiencies” or manage financial risks.152 
DHBs remain somewhat controversial. Elected representatives’ suitability to the complex work 
board members must undertake is frequently questioned.153 Elected members need not, and 
often do not, have previous governance or financial experience.154 Furthermore, DHBs 
allocating funding may affect lives, placing added stress on inexperienced members perhaps 
already struggling with complex medical terminology.155 Members seeking re-election may be 
distracted from the DHB’s main business by headline-grabbing issues such as fluoride,156 and 
often underestimate the time required for DHB matters weekly.157 Some commentators have 
also advocated for smaller boards to increase decision-making efficiency, while others criticise 
board members’ lack of understanding of DHBs’ statutory obligations.158 
Given the significance of healthcare provision and DHB budgets, central government has again 
sought to retain much control, although the intervention regime is far less complex than for 
local government. 
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The minister may appoint a Crown monitor, where considered desirable for improving the 
DHB’s performance. There need be no particular problem requiring resolution, as for the Part 
10 local government powers; the option is available whenever improvement might be possible. 
Crown monitors are similar to, but distinct from, local government Crown observers. Crown 
monitors observe board decisions and processes and advise the Minister on any issues, but must 
also aid the DHB in understanding government policies and wishes so that board decisions can 
“appropriately reflect” them, illustrating the greater control central government has over 
DHBs.159 Monitors may attend any DHB meeting and access any Board documentation.160 
Alternatively, the Minister can sack the board and appoint a commission; he/she need only be 
seriously dissatisfied with the board’s performance and give written notice.161 The commission 
acquires all the DHB’s powers, duties and functions and the Minister may dismiss 
commissioners at will.162 Again, there need not be a particular problem, or any prescribed level 
of severity and the legislation does not reference consultation for any proposed action.  
The Minister can also sack the chairperson/deputy if notice is given and the individual and 
DHB consulted.163 While separate from the statute’s other intervention options, this power 
could still influence decision-making, although the chair has no particular additional powers 
and no casting vote.164 
Under the Crown Entities Act 2004, the Minister may request any information pertaining to 
the DHB’s operations.165 Ministers may also issue directions regarding eligibility for funded 
services or provision of specified services where considered “necessary and expedient”.166 
These are in addition to the more general powers to direct crown agents to effect government 
policy.167 
B Interventions in practice 
At present, only one DHB has been replaced by a commission, three have received Crown 
monitors and two have had their chairs sacked. However, these intervention powers have been 
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used even more inconsistently than for local government, apparently driven by politics rather 
than concern for communities’ interests. 
I Commissions 
The only DHB to be replaced by a commission is Hawke’s Bay’s. In February 2008, then-
Health Minister, David Cunliffe, considered a $7.7 million deficit, deteriorating relationships 
between the board, himself and staff and the Board’s attacking him in the media “to advance 
the personal agenda of Board members” sufficient grounds for dismissal.168 He accused 
members of driving away clinicians and bullying staff.169 The Board had a week to respond but 
failed to sway the Minister. In Parliament, Cunliffe’s biggest concern was not the magnitude 
of the budget blowout, but the Board’s lack of a credible plan to address the problem.170 He 
felt a Commission was necessary, despite the Board proposing a Crown monitor instead.171 
Initial problems had arisen over contracts worth up to $50 million entered into despite a 
government-appointed DHB member’s, Peter Hausmann’s, significant conflicts of interest.172 
The Director-General of Health compiled a report on the DHB’s governance issues, but its 
release was delayed by the Board successfully gaining an injunction.173 Cunliffe opted not to 
wait two weeks for the report’s release, and appointed a commission.174  The report itself 
recommended only a Crown monitor, to provide some external input regarding the handling of 
conflicts of interest, both Hausmann’s and in general.175 It also identified conflicts between the 
Board and management, with “a perception…that the Board had overreached its governance 
role into operational areas”.176 
The dismissal was roundly criticised as “an alarming abuse of political power” against 
“democratically elected representatives.”177 Former Board chair, Kevin Atkinson, considered 
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Cunliffe’s decision a reaction to the Board’s refusing “to endorse… political cronyism and 
chicanery” and insistence on pursuing the judicial review case.178 The deficit was blamed on 
underfunding.179 Atkinson asserted that some comments had been incorrectly attributed to him 
and he had not criticised Cunliffe.180 Meanwhile, Cunliffe used parliamentary privilege to call 
the DHB “a nasty little nest of self-perpetuating, provincial elites who have been propping each 
other up”.181 
The affair prompted an urgent parliamentary debate. Heather Roy argued that Hawke’s Bay 
had one of the country’s best DHBs and that the deficit was only 2.5% of its annual funding.182 
Ten other DHBs had more significant deficits than Hawke’s Bay.183 She believed Cunliffe had 
been blinded by his belief that the Board had been publicly criticising him, something MPs 
should be accustomed to, and protested his sacking the Board after only 72 days in office.184 
He responded that the vast majority of the Board had been there since at least 2001.185 Five 
local mayors also showed support for the Board and its chair in a joint letter to the Minister.186 
However, journalists privy to communications between key DHB figures reported “a torrid 
story of an organisation in chaos with fault residing on all sides”.187 
Ultimately, the sacked DHB sought a judicial review of Cunliffe’s decision to dismiss them, 
citing a wide range of grounds, including unreasonableness, irrelevant considerations including 
the employment relationship between the Board and Chief Executive, improperly conducted 
surveys of clinicians’ opinions and failure to consider “objective measures of Board 
performance”.188 Cunliffe was accused of breaching natural justice, predetermining the matter 
                                               
178 “Health Minister fires Hawke’s Bay DHB”, above n 177. 
179 Letter from Kevin Atkinson to David Cunliffe, above n 171. 
180 (4 March 2008) 645 NZPD 14530; Letter from Kevin Atkinson to David Cunliffe, above n 171. 
181 Synopsis of Submissions on Behalf of Plaintiffs in the matter of Hawke’s Bay Regional Council v the 
Minister of Health CIV 2008-441-145. 
182 (4 March 2008) 645 NZPD 14530. Ministry of Health, above n 144, at 2. 
183 (4 March 2008) 645 NZPD 14530. 
184 (4 March 2008) 645 NZPD 14530. 
185 (4 March 2008) 645 NZPD 14530. 
186 (4 March 2008) 645 NZPD 14530; “Mayors: We stand by sacked board” (online ed, Hawke’s Bay Today, 18 
March 2008). 
187 John Armstrong “Cabinet’s Action Man cops sacking backlash” (online, New Zealand Herald, Auckland, 1 
March 2008). 
188 Synopsis of Submissions on Behalf of Plaintiffs in the matter of Hawke’s Bay Regional Council v the 
Minister of Health CIV 2008-441-145 at [66], [84], [87] and [88]. 
26           For the people, by the minister: ministerial interventions in subnational, elected bodies and a principled approach to their future application 
 
 
 
and of bias by allowing Hausmann far greater opportunities to address criticism than the Board 
was afforded.189 The court documents also attack Cunliffe for interfering with democracy.190 
The judicial review case was never heard. The new National government in December 2008 
reinstated the sacked DHB members, but negotiated with local councils to retain Commissioner 
Sir John Anderson on the Board.191 
2 Crown Monitors 
Capital and Coast DHB received a Crown monitor in December 2007, after debt reached $47.5 
million and problems emerged with maternity and child oncological care, tensions between 
staff and management and preventable deaths of patients on waiting lists.192 Health Minister 
David Cunliffe also replaced the chairperson.193 National, in opposition, criticised this 
approach as unlikely to be effective but has continued the Crown monitoring into its third term 
of office.194 
Whanganui DHB received two Crown monitors in April 2008 to address business and 
governance difficulties.195 Several “scathing reports” had criticised the board’s performance, 
particularly regarding the appointment of obstetrician Roman Hasil who subsequently 
improperly performed thirty-two sterilisations after insufficient board monitoring.196 Concerns 
were also raised over a $7 million deficit, staff shortages and the loss of 166 patient referrals 
to specialists.197 
A Crown monitor was appointed to Southern DHB in May 2010, when it was formed by 
merging Southland and Otago DHBs.198 The two former DHBs had experienced deficits for 
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ten to fifteen years, with annual shortfalls of around $10 million and looming capital works 
costs.199 In July 2013, Dr Jan White became the next Crown monitor, with the intention that 
she will remain in office until the Board ceases to be in deficit.200 
Other DHBs have previously agreed to board advisors being appointed to perform a similar 
function to Crown monitors but circumvent the legislation.201 
3 Sacking DHB chairs 
Otago DHB chairman, Richard Thomson, was sacked in February 2009 by then-Health 
Minister Tony Ryall after the DHB’s chief information officer defrauded it of $16.9 million.202 
This was despite the fraud starting before Thomson’s term and three former ministers and 
Otago healthcare professionals supporting his continued tenure.203 Labour labelled the move 
“nonsensical” since Thomson had “helped catch the crook”,204 while Thomson felt National 
was deliberately attacking a known Labour supporter.205 By comparison, Mary Hackett 
survived calls for her dismissal as Bay of Plenty DHB’s chairperson in 2002 after collecting 
$1,125 fees for meetings she did not attend and subsequently lying about it.206 
4 Critiquing the regime’s application 
As for local government, the Minister has very significant discretion to intervene. Indeed, this 
regime is even more forgiving of ministers, lacking definitive thresholds, while the absence of 
a requirement that there be a particular problem the intervention should address means a 
general sense of unease with the DHB’s progress is sufficient. Thus, a DHB may be performing 
comparatively well, but if improvement is possible, a Crown monitor might be appointed. 
Such significant discretion may again cause DHB processes to stagnate as Board members 
second-guess decisions to keep the Minister happy. However, this is arguably less significant 
than for local government since the Minister need not use intervention processes to coerce 
DHBs into doing as he/she wishes; the regime is designed to ensure that his/her policies are 
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followed anyway. Furthermore, ministerial intervention powers have rarely been exercised. 
Since the first DHB elections in 2001, only one commission and three Crown monitors have 
been appointed, although those Crown monitors have been in place for a very long time. 
However, heightened discretion may allow ministers to exercise their intervention powers 
inappropriately for political gain. The contrast between the Hawke’s Bay and Capital & Coast 
DHBs’ experiences is stark. The former had amassed only a fraction of Capital & Coast’s debt, 
and had maintained public confidence while Capital & Coast was much maligned.207 Cunliffe 
argued that the differing responses were because the issues for Capital and Coast were “at the 
clinical and management level” while those for Hawke’s Bay were at the “governance level”.208 
However, it seems unlikely management issues alone would cause such a significant debt. 
Political motivations better explain the disparity. Should a Minister exercise their powers for 
an improper purpose, the decision can be challenged under judicial review. However, Ministers 
may avoid scrutiny, as Board members may be concerned for their present or future 
appointments. 
It is perhaps arguable that the significant discretion afforded the Minister is entirely appropriate 
since DHBs are not and should not be ‘as democratic’ as local councils, given the complexity 
of their work and their closer relationship with the Crown, emphasised by their being partially 
appointed. Elected members merely ensure greater public participation than other consultation 
processes and their overriding obligations are to the Minister and to implement government 
policy.209 Since they are elected to implement government policy, with a nod to community 
concerns, it is arguably appropriate for the Minister to dismiss them if seriously dissatisfied.  
Applying Bovens’ three perspectives, the democratic element is once again problematic. While 
ministerial decisions can be traced back to a democratic mandate, through their position as an 
elected MP appointed to the role by a democratically-elected Government formed from the 
majority party/coalition in the House, the DHB also has democratic legitimacy through its 
elected members. The principle of subsidiarity also mandates that decisions be made as locally 
as possible. Local decisions should be made by officials elected by the local electorate rather 
than a mix of local and non-local people. However, DHBs also have appointed members and 
are restricted to primarily implementing ministerial policy and so arguably have a lesser 
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democratic mandate than the Minister. Thus, the democratic aspect is perhaps not as troubling 
as for local government.  
Furthermore, as for local council elections, voter turnout for DHB elections is very low, around 
40%.210 Thirty percent of people polled had no interest in DHB elections whatsoever.211 In 
addition, there are serious questions about the quality of elected candidates. Despite the 
complex management minefield that is sitting on a DHB, less than seven percent of voters 
reportedly look for management or financial experience in candidates (61% look for experience 
in healthcare).212 Thus perhaps it is preferable to allow the Minister significant discretion to 
intervene. 
Regarding the constitutional perspective and the desire to minimise concentrations of power, 
the ministerial intervention scheme for DHBs scores poorly. Ministers still exert very 
significant control and can easily sack elected members and replace them with commissioners 
they appoint. 
In terms of the learning perspective, there is capacity for assisting DHBs in improving 
performance through Ministry monitoring or the appointment of a Crown monitor. The absence 
of an obligation on the Minister to consult with DHBs before acting denies them an opportunity 
for dialogue and improvement. However, since there is no specific statutory provision 
regarding consultation, as there is for local government, a court might imply natural justice 
requirements. 
C Other accountability mechanisms 
DHBs are subject to strategic directions from the Minister. The Minister may direct all DHBs 
“for the purpose of supporting government policy on improving… effectiveness and 
efficiency”.213 Like local councils, DHBs must produce district annual plans including goals, 
expectations as to performance and financial matters.214 However, the Minister must approve 
plans before they are released. These plans must also abide by Planning Regulations.215 In 
addition, a five to ten year plan must be produced through community consultation and 
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approved by the Minister.216 DHBs must also report regularly on whether they are meeting 
these plans.217 The Crown Funding Agreement between DHBs and the Crown also provides 
another way for the Minister to monitor DHBs, this time in an output-focused manner.218 DHBs 
must also produce an Annual Report under the Crown Entities Act 2004, which enables 
Parliamentary select committees to undertake financial reviews.219 
Since 2009, the National Health Board has been responsible for monitoring DHBs as well as 
providing funding and planning services.220 The Board is appointed by the minister and has a 
dedicated business unit within the Ministry of Health.221 Like local councils, DHBs are subject 
to Ombudsman inquiries and regular audits by the Auditor-General.222 
DHBs are also obligated to set up advisory committees on community and public health, 
disability support and hospital matters.223 Public membership of such committees can allow for 
further participation and consultation. 
D Summary 
The Health Minister has very significant discretion to appoint either a Crown monitor or 
commission, which in Hawke’s Bay DHB’s case was utilised with questionable motivations. 
DHBs are partially elected and must implement ministerial policy so have far less ‘democratic 
legitimacy’ than local councils, making such interventions perhaps less of an affront to 
democracy. Power remains heavily concentrated in central government. 
IV Boards of Trustees 
Boards of trustees operate very differently from local authorities and DHBs, controlling one 
school among thousands. However, they are entirely elected and their widely-used intervention 
regime offers an interesting comparator. The regime is the most discretionary so far, but 
Ministry of Education practice has been to use it sparingly; the result is a more effective 
intervention regime than might otherwise be anticipated. 
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A The statutory regime 
All New Zealand state and state-integrated schools require boards of trustees.224 Boards of 
trustees are responsible for governance, the principal for day-to-day management.225 Trustees 
have a three year term of office.226 Boards of trustees determine “the school’s strategic and 
policy direction”, oversee financial, staff and curriculum management and monitor progress 
against set targets.227 Boards of trustees have “complete discretion” in management, but must 
act to ensure every student can “attain his or her highest possible standard in educational 
achievement”.228 
School boards of trustees comprise three to seven parent representatives, the school’s principal 
as chief executive and a staff representative.229 Parent representatives are elected by parents 
and adult students but need not themselves be parents or students.230 Trustees may also be co-
opted by the Board and schools with full-time students in year 9 or above require a student 
representative.231  
Boards of trustees constitute a special class of Crown entity, subject only to certain specified 
provisions of the Crown Entities Act 2004, primarily regarding financial matters.232 Of note, 
while Ministers may direct DHBs to effect government policy, boards of trustees are exempt, 
although may be instructed to give effect to a ‘whole of government approach’.233 
Boards of trustees have yet another different intervention regime, refined in October 2001.234 
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Note that the Secretary of Education can also permit interventions, although he/she can only 
dissolve a board where it has not met in three months, no member remains who can conduct 
meetings, fewer than three trustees have been elected or there are problems with the election 
Diagram 4: “Statutory Intervention Process” 
From Ministry of Education Review of Statutory Interventions in State Schools and 
State Integrated Schools: Final Report and Recommendations to the Minister of 
Education (November 2014) at 6. 
Diagram 3:Ministerial intervention powers for boards of trustees 
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process.235 The Secretary can also require the board of trustees to provide information which 
the Minister can only do under the Crown Entities Act 2004.236 These powers are unlimited. 
Interventions in boards of trustees do resemble a menu and may, except for the commission, 
be utilised concurrently.237 If the Minister reasonably believes a risk to the school’s operation, 
students’ welfare or performance exists, he/she may select any option he/she wishes. This 
provides significant discretion since this threshold is easily met and there is no specified 
standard of evidence of a problem’s existence. A risk to students’ performance in particular 
seems a low standard since a vast number of seemingly innocuous things might impact some 
students’ performance to an unspecified degree, for example a favourite teacher leaving. 
However, the legislative regime also states that the Minister should not intervene “more than 
necessary.”238 
There is no requirement regarding consultation before the minister intervenes. The wide range 
of options is more akin to those for local government than DHBs. However, mandating 
specialist assistance or the creation of an action plan are unique to this regime, ensuring that 
the board of trustees gets help but its decision-making authority is not affected. For the former, 
the Minister must identify the individuals or entity the board should engage for assistance.239 
A limited statutory manager is similar to a local government Crown manager, in that they take 
only the powers or duties the minister vests in them, leaving other functions with the board of 
trustees. As for DHBs, appointing a commission dissolves the board entirely. Any statutory 
appointees must work independently of the Ministry, asking only for “general consultative 
advice”.240 The Minister must review all interventions annually.241 
Given New Zealand has 2,532 schools, Ministry of Education policy is well-defined, setting 
out extensively how and when interventions will occur once it is made aware of the issue by 
Education Review Office reports, the media, public or parental concern.242 Its documentation 
emphasises that the “level of evidence-based identified risk will determine the level of 
intervention applied” and that it will intervene “no more than is necessary” while “promptly 
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and effectively” addressing risks and preventing future problems.243 Risks to schools’ operation 
may include financial, personnel and asset management, inadequate communication with 
parents and “poor community relations”.244 Student welfare issues might include health and 
safety problems, “high suspension, exclusion and expulsion rates”.245 Student performance 
matters could include staffing problems, low achievement generally and amongst particular 
groups as well as problems with the curriculum and assessment.246 
B Interventions in practice 
The Ministry reports that 2.8% of schools (69) are subject to statutory interventions at any one 
point in time.247 Current intervention numbers are shown below:248 
 
 
 
 
Research into individual statutory interventions is hindered by the paucity of information, since 
many are not especially newsworthy. There are also minimal cases where judicial review is 
                                               
243 Ministry of Education, Interventions: Guide for Schools, above n 234, at [6]. 
244 At [13]. 
245 At [14]. 
246 At [15]. 
247 Ministry of Education Review of Statutory Interventions in State Schools and State Integrated Schools: Final 
Report and Recommendations to the Minister of Education (November 2014) at 6. One school has two separate 
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Table 1: “Number of Statutory Interventions, by region as at 31/10/2014” 
From Ministry of Education Review of Statutory Interventions in State Schools and 
State Integrated Schools: Final Report and Recommendations to the Minister of 
Education (November 2014) at 6. 
35           For the people, by the minister: ministerial interventions in subnational, elected bodies and a principled approach to their future application 
 
 
 
even threatened and it is often avoided by out of court settlements. However, from the 
information available, it appears that particularly the more serious intervention powers are used 
discerningly, with Ministry guidance adding a significant gloss to the statutory regime. 
1 Commissions 
Twenty-two schools currently have commissioners.249 
Commissioners were appointed to Te Kura Kaupapa Maori o Whangaroa in Matauri Bay, 
Northland, in June 2014 and the board dismissed after only a year in office due to problems 
running board elections, including a failure to publicly advertise, tension over the principal’s 
dismissal a year earlier and subsequent parental backlash, staff being locked out and a plunging 
roll (down from 103 to 36).250 The board of trustees claimed it had been blindsided and likened 
the intervention “to the imposition of Marshall [sic] Law”, subsequently initiating judicial 
review.251 However, an out-of-court settlement meant this was abandoned, with the 
commissioner being replaced, former trustees standing in a new election and a working group 
established to review intervention processes.252  
Moerewa School, also in Northland, received a commission in April 2012 after the school 
refused to close its senior classes (Years 11 to 13).253 It retained these students without Ministry 
approval and continued to post substandard NCEA results, with accusations of students 
copying Wikipedia and work containing multiple handwritings.254 However, the former board 
chair said students had only returned for a farewell powhiri and the school had wide community 
support.255 The Board was granted a new constitution in March 2014, heralding a return to 
elected representation.256 
Isla Bank School, in Southland, was appointed a commission in November 2014, after all but 
two trustees resigned and parents complained that they were being ignored. However, the 
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commissioner, Paul Ferris, believes the intervention will last only “between six and nine 
months” as there is nothing “seriously broken”.257  
Masterton’s Makoura College received a commission in 2008, after the board resigned amid 
attempts to close the school, which were widely resisted by the community.258 7510 people 
signed a petition to save one of only two secular state schools in the city and the only school 
serving low socio-economic areas.259 The school’s roll had declined from 425 in 2002 to 220 
in 2008, alongside significant staff vacancies.260 A limited statutory manager in 2005 had 
already attempted to resolve employment and human resources problems, and a financial 
adviser was subsequently brought in.261 NCEA pass rates were around 20% lower than 
nationally.262 Supporters of the school’s continued existence advocated the commissioner’s 
appointment to address the community’s lack of confidence in the board.263 Since the 
commissioner’s appointment, the roll has increased significantly, as have NCEA pass rates.264 
2 Limited Statutory Managers 
Forty schools currently have limited statutory managers.265 
Ngaruawahia High School received two limited statutory managers in April 2013 and credits 
them with preventing its closure.266 The managers addressed high truancy rates, plunging rolls 
and $170,000 debt, recouping the deficit, increasing attendance rates twenty percent and 
tripling Year 9 enrolments.267 
The decile ten Chelsea Primary School, in Chatswood, received a limited statutory manager 
after a very poor ERO report highlighted an inadequate complaints system and “poor 
relationships” between board members as preventing progress.268 
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Christchurch’s Linwood College sought a statutory manager in September 2014 to take over 
all employment matters to address staffing issues.269 Control had only returned to the board in 
June 2012 after issues moving the school post-earthquakes meant it was sacked in March 
2011.270 
3 Critiquing the regime’s application 
Regarding Bovens’ democratic perspective, there is once again tension between the board of 
trustees’ more local democracy and the Minister’s democratic pedigree through national 
elections. Indeed, a school community is even more localised than a council’s constituency, 
heightening the issue of subsidiarity. Because schools are such small communities, their 
characteristics and interests may well be radically different from that of the general population, 
so cannot be represented by a nationally elected minister; a local council’s electorate is more 
likely to be statistically similar to the national population. Furthermore, there may be questions 
over what rights parents have to some level of control over their child’s education and whether 
this is interfered with should a minister replace a board the parents have elected. 
Since boards of trustees are elected and operate independently, if a commission is appointed 
perhaps elected members should not necessarily be removed from office. For local councils, 
where a commission is appointed, representatives remain in office but are powerless to act, 
enabling them to return to their roles proper should the commission resolve matters efficiently. 
However, perhaps that this is not the case for boards of trustees reflects their position as Crown 
entities, as opposed to separate bodies like councils. Furthermore, trustees may have a better 
understanding of a school’s special characteristics such as for Kura Kaupapa Maori. The 
Ministry has recently suggested the development of separate protocols for these schools.271 
Individualised democratic boards of trustees have been controversial since their introduction 
with the ‘Tomorrow’s Schools’ reforms and the Education Act 1989.272 Previously, schools 
were managed by “unresponsive, non-participatory, inflexible and inefficient” local education 
councils overseen by the Department of Education.273 Indeed, democratisation of school boards 
is an international trend.274 However, the level of devolution, an extreme seen nowhere else in 
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the world, was accused of implementing a more commercial outlook, with schools dependent 
on keeping ‘customers’ happy and sending their children to the school.275 Others advocate for 
a system of everyone voting for a district education board, like a DHB, eliminating 
redundancies inherent in overlapping board functions.276 There is also concern to somehow 
represent the interests of local taxpayers without school-age children, since they cannot vote 
for boards of trustees (although they can stand for election).277 However, it is questionable 
whether ministerial intervention powers help address these issues. 
Boards of trustees may also not adequately represent their own school community.278 While no 
research exists as to which parents tend to sit on boards of trustees, it would appear anecdotally 
to be primarily those from higher socio-economic groups, perhaps due to greater understanding 
of the system, time or sway among other parents. This may lead to inherent bias away from 
students from less affluent backgrounds.  
Many parents also do not vote in board of trustees’ elections and fewer still will stand, 
problematic since 12,785 parent representatives are needed nationwide.279 There is a high 
turnover rate and those standing may lack the knowledge or capacity required to be effective 
trustees.280 Indeed, fifteen percent of boards of trustees are estimated to be performing 
poorly.281 Such problems have also led to a decline in parental trust in both schools and staff.282 
Regarding the constitutional perspective and the risk of the centralisation of power, this is 
minimised by commissioners and statutory appointees being independent of the 
Ministry/Minister. There is thus no scope to exercise direct control over the school, even once 
an intervention has occurred. However, the commissioner would still be appointed by the 
Minister leaving room for more subtle control. 
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As noted above, the minister has significant discretion. Minor events could negatively impact 
the performance of a limited number of students and thus pave the way for anything from an 
action plan to the Board’s dismissal. The Ministry also has a very wide range of matters it 
would consider intervening to address.283 However, its documentation and practice suggest that 
it is discerning when utilising each intervention option and tries to go no further than is needed 
to rectify the particular issue as is required by statute.284 The Ministry also offers professional 
advice and development, small amounts of additional funding to allow this and “low-level 
support and advice” before seeking intervention, as illustrated below.285  
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Diagram 5: Ministry of Education’s “support, collaboration and intervention 
framework” 
From Ministry of Education Review of Statutory Interventions in State Schools and 
State Integrated Schools: Final Report and Recommendations to the Minister of 
Education (November 2014) at 7. 
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Thus, the Ministry has, or rather chooses to have, little coercive power over both boards and 
appointees, leaving independent boards of trustees to better advocate and lobby for students’ 
interests in a way that the ‘less democratic’ DHBs cannot.286  However, boards may be 
conscious of the fact that once interventions have started, they generally last a long time. A 
sample of fifty schools which have had commissions revealed twenty-one lasted for over two 
years.287  
Considering the learning perspective, there is significant scope for the Ministry to work with 
troubled schools to improve outcomes. The Ministry also has reporting, review and evaluation 
systems to improve the efficacy of interventions.288 However, more could still be done, with 
the Ministry’s review of statutory interventions reporting that 96% of respondents wanted a 
more “transparent framework for determining and reporting risk in schools” to allow schools 
to better determine their intervention risks, followed up by early warning meetings.289 
Furthermore, 79% also wanted an annual review of intervention procedures, while many 
thought that specific interventions should be reviewed every three to six months, not 
annually.290 
The specialist advice and action plan options for boards of trustees are arguably superior to 
CRTs or Crown observers for local government, or Crown monitors for DHBs. Both leave 
control firmly with the board and allow them better to learn to address problems (although 
there is potential for abuse given the Ministry determines which experts should be hired). Any 
specialist advisor is not responsible to the Minister as Crown observers or monitors are.291 
While the action plan must be approved by the Education Secretary, it is produced by the board. 
These options do not represent close ministerial scrutiny, reducing the risk of board processes 
stagnating for fear of ministerial action. There is less scope for the Ministry to subtly impose 
its will, as a Crown observer may do through access to meetings and key figures. However, 
this perhaps removes some of the incentive to improve. 
The option of a limited statutory manager before a commission is an important one for 
safeguarding the board’s autonomy as far as possible, as with the Crown manager option for 
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local government. It gives the board of trustees the opportunity to learn from mistakes, before 
all power is confiscated. The Ministry does appear to be making good use of the limited 
statutory managers option, there being twice as many of these in place than commissions.292 
As for the other two examples thus far, there is no requirement that the minister consult 
anybody before intervening, which again is troubling. However, documents published by the 
Ministry indicate that it “will begin by scoping the identified and related issues”, through work 
with the board of trustees, senior management, ERO and teachers’ union field officers.293 They 
conclude that “experience has shown that a board that has been included” in the processes of 
identifying risks and intervention options “will be more likely to work co-operatively with the 
intervention”, although “consultation may be brief or limited” where “swift action is 
needed”.294 This appears a useful gloss on the statutory framework and one which a judicial 
review applicant may claim to have relied upon. Such attempts to work with boards of trustees 
rather than against them also appear in the context of notification, with the Ministry noting that 
“common courtesy for optimum success of the intervention requires additional methods of 
notification” to mere inclusion in the Gazette.295 Furthermore, the Ministry recommends that 
commissioners establish a “representative community advisory group to provide a parent 
community perspective.”296 However, this is at the commissioner’s discretion.297 
C Other accountability mechanisms 
Every school requires a charter prepared by the board of trustees, and each charter must be 
approved by the Minister (the Ministry will prepare a charter for the school if one is not 
completed within six months).298 Boards of trustees prepare annual plans to identify any 
deviation from the objectives the charter contains.299 The Ministry also prepares National 
Educational Guidelines, “which are deemed to be included in every school charter.”300 
The Education Review Office acts either at the Minister’s direction or of its own volition to 
review schools’ performance using its “extensive powers of entry, inspection and obtaining 
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297 Ministry of Education “Key information on Section 78N(1) Statutory Interventions” (9 December 2013, 
<www.minedu.govt.nz>). 
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information.”301 Schools are also subject to investigations by the Ombudsman, Auditor-
General and “international review”, for example through OECD statistics.302 
D Summary 
Interventions in boards of trustees, including requiring specialist assistance, appointing a 
limited statutory manager or commission, are permissible where the minister reasonably 
believes there to be a risk to the school’s operation or student welfare or performance, a wide 
discretion, but one exercised selectively. There are no appointed board members, unlike for 
DHBs. 
V Tertiary Institutions 
Tertiary institutions may not appear an intuitive comparator; they often do not serve defined 
areas like councils, DHBs or even schools. However, like these bodies, they are governed by 
(mostly) democratically-elected councils, with a similar ministerial intervention regime. 
Indeed, the Crown observer option for local government originated in the regime discussed 
below. As a partially elected, partially appointed body, they can inform discussion on DHBs’ 
experiences. 
A The statutory regime 
Tertiary institutions are governed by councils, which must prepare the relevant plans to seek 
funding, ensure the institution is managed accordingly and determine the “institution’s long-
term strategic direction.”303 The council must strive for excellence in education and research, 
encourage participation of the communities it services and ensure financial responsibility.304  
Until February 2015, councils comprised between twelve and twenty members, including four 
ministerial appointees, the chief executive, between one and three elected staff representatives 
and between one and three elected student representatives.305 Depending on the institution’s 
programmes, another member might be appointed through consultation with a relevant 
union.306 However, the Education Amendment Act 2015 reduced councils to between eight and 
twelve members, with three ministerial representatives for councils numbering below ten, and 
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four otherwise.307 Provisions for staff and student representatives were also removed.308 The 
council still should reflect New Zealand’s “ethnic and socio-economic diversity” and a gender 
balance.309 Members hold office for four years.310 The council elects its own chairperson and 
deputy.311 
Since 2009, polytechnics have a different council arrangement, with four ministerial appointees 
and four “members appointed by the council in accordance with its statutes” which may allow 
for democratic representation.312 The Minister may also appoint the chair and deputy chair.313 
Tertiary institutions constitute their own category of Crown entity, but unlike for boards of 
trustees, it is the institution, not the council, which is the Crown entity.314 Tertiary institutions 
are subject to even fewer of the Crown Entities Act provisions than boards of trustees, avoiding 
provisions on ministerial requests for information and ministerial directions, including “whole 
of government” approaches.315 
The intervention framework is once again different for tertiary institutions. Whether a tertiary 
institution is at risk is determined against a set of criteria promulgated by the Secretary in the 
Gazette.316 Organisational criteria include the council failing in its statutory obligations and 
having inadequate systems to support financial and educational performance. Financial risks 
include where tertiary institutions cannot pay debts as they fall due. Educational criteria include 
where the institution fails to meet performance commitments or, for a polytechnic, where 
NZQA lacks confidence in its assessment capabilities.317 
The Tertiary Education Commission’s chief executive may request information from an 
institution where “he or she has reasonable grounds to believe that an institution may be at 
risk”.318 The information requested may be specific information on an institution’s operation, 
finances or management or “reports at specified intervals”.319 
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The Minister’s options are limited to appointing a Crown observer or dismissing the council 
and appointing a commissioner. A Crown observer is available where the Minister identifies, 
with reasonable grounds, a risk to an institution’s operation or long-term existence.320 This 
provision inspired the LGA provisions on Crown observers, who may attend any meetings, 
offer advice and report to the Minister.321 Dissolution of the council and appointment of a 
commissioner may only occur where the Minister considers on reasonable grounds there to be 
“a serious risk to the operation or long-term viability of the institution” and other methods of 
risk reduction are insufficient.322 A “serious risk” is circularly defined as where the institution 
cannot pay its debts and the criteria published in the Gazette identify a serious level of risk.323  
The major difference with the other regimes examined thus far is that the Minister must consult 
before intervention action is taken.324 For Crown observers, the council must be allowed to 
comment; for commissioners, “any other interested parties” must be consulted, which may well 
include all staff, students, and members of the community the institution serves. Alongside a 
Commissioner, the Minister must also appoint an advisory committee of up to five people, 
whose composition “reasonably reflects the community”.325  
                                               
320 Section 195C(1). 
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  Diagram 6:Ministerial intervention powers for tertiary institution councils 
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Polytechnics may be subject to further interventions. The Tertiary Education Commission’s 
chief executive may require a polytechnic to obtain specialist assistance where he/she 
reasonably believes students’ educational performance or the polytechnic is at risk.326 He/she 
may also require the polytechnic to prepare a performance improvement plan.327 
Alternatively, the minister, where he/she reasonably believes “that there is a serious risk to the 
operation or long-term viability of a polytechnic, or that the education performance of the 
students at a polytechnic is at risk”, may appoint a Crown manager.328 Notice and time for the 
council to respond are required.329 The Crown manager may perform any functions included 
in their notice of appointment. The minister may also remove any member of a polytechnic 
council for any just cause, including misconduct, breach of duty or “inability to perform the 
functions of office”.330 
B Interventions in practice 
Thus far, only polytechnics have experienced the intervention regime. 
Wanganui Regional Community Polytechnic received a Crown manager in December 2000, 
after accruing an operating loss of around $2 million the year before.331 The Crown manager 
was to address the Polytechnic’s financial performance, in conjunction with a significant 
bailout. 
Northland Polytechnic received a Crown observer in early 2002 to address its financial issues, 
including a $3.7 million deficit.332 This was later upgraded to a Crown manager when the 
Government gave the institution a $5.5 million loan.333 
1 Critiquing the regime’s application 
The reduced range of intervention options for most tertiary institutions, compared to those for 
local government, boards of trustees or even polytechnics, raises questions. However, perhaps 
there is no need for them. Polytechnics tend to have more problems, hence the increased 
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options. The regime for tertiary institutions is the only one requiring consultation before the 
minister acts. The restrictions on appointing a commission also assist in protecting the council 
from ministerial coercion. However, coercion is still possible; Otago Polytechnic lost funding 
when it refused a Crown manager and requested a crown observer instead.334 
From a democratic perspective, once again tension exists between representatives elected by 
the institution’s community, although this community is not as geographically defined as for 
the previous examples, and a Minister gaining power in national elections. However, as with 
DHBs, some council members are ministerial appointees and thus gain democratic legitimacy 
indirectly through him/her, making the minister comparatively more directly connected to the 
people and thus he/she should arguably have greater control. However, these non-elected 
members represent less than half of the council. The requirement to consult before acting also 
returns a modicum of local democratic legitimacy as does requiring a representative advisory 
committee, although this is not elected.  
A polytechnic council’s democratic legitimacy is minimal, it being half staffed by ministerial 
appointees and having no requirement for democratic representation. Furthermore, even if 
elected, members may not actually be representative since some polytechnics serve multiple 
diverse communities such as University College of Learning’s Palmerston North, Wanganui 
and Masterton campuses.335 Universities also will have large catchment areas. Furthermore, 
when a polytechnic starts up, presumably only the ministerial appointees will be in place 
immediately to pass the statutes and determine how the rest of the council is selected. In light 
of this dubious democratic legitimacy, perhaps the minister should have ultimate authority. 
There is also no provision for student or staff representation, perhaps due to most students 
attending for a short duration.336  
Constitutionally, ministers’ abilities to replace the council with appointees, or at least influence 
its decision-making through the presence of a Crown observer, are again concerning. However, 
the minister arguably already influences councils through his/her appointees, although they do 
not have a majority. Thus, the Minister may acquire some power by dismissing the council. 
From the learning perspective, the availability of criteria identifying when institutions are at 
risk beforehand encourages self-reflection. The Minister’s consultation obligations allow a 
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dialogue between actor and forum. Appointing a Crown observer also allows for greater 
learning and perhaps aversion of a commission, although there could be a greater range of 
options as for polytechnics. Indeed, concern has been raised about the government’s lack of 
ability to intervene in tertiary institutions, given that it is their primary funder.337 
C Other accountability mechanisms 
The Tertiary Education Commission is to “give effect to the tertiary education strategy” 
through providing guidance, determining and allocating funding and advising the Minister on 
policy implementation and sector performance.338 The Minister may also delegate any 
Education Act functions and powers to the Commission but may not direct it to deny a 
particular organisation funding.339 Plans must be submitted to the Commission detailing how 
the tertiary institution will meet the “Government’s current and medium-term priorities as 
described in the tertiary education strategy” as well as more general descriptions of its activities 
and goals.340 These form some of the criteria the Commission must apply to determine how to 
allocate funding, ensuring the Government has a significant role in the proposal even though a 
more independent body does the actual allocating.341 
Tertiary institutions are also subject to investigations by the Ombudsman and Auditor-
General.342 
D Summary 
The minister may intervene in tertiary institutions through a Crown observer or commission. 
Polytechnics may also be appointed a Crown manager or specialist assistance. Councils’ high 
proportion of ministerial appointees (especially for polytechnics) undermine their direct 
democratic legitimacy and perhaps better justify ministerial intervention. However, these 
intervention schemes are rarely used. 
The intervention schemes examined can be summarised as follows: 
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VI Suggested intervention principles 
This part suggests principles for determining when different ministerial interventions are 
appropriate, which transcend these separate, but similar, regimes. They might thus be utilised 
whenever intervention in an elected subnational body is contemplated, applying to a greater or 
lesser extent depending on the body’s democratic legitimacy and autonomy. Their purpose is 
to ensure democratic perspectives are recognised while enabling sub-national bodies to access 
support and learn for the future.  
Ideally, legislation could harmonise these statutes, accounting for each body’s democratic 
credentials, making all intervention options available, subject to easily-applied criteria. 
Legislation could for example increase DHBs’ limited intervention options. Alternatively, 
  Table 2: Summary of intervention regimes discussed 
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statutory intervention regimes might explicitly contain, within a section or schedule, such a list 
of principles as mandatory relevant considerations for decision-makers, rather than relying on 
judicial interpretation or voluntary use. 
However, such legislation is highly unlikely given this is not a government priority. These 
principles might instead form a gloss on the current vague, highly discretionary statutory 
regimes. Much might be achieved through informal measures, such as ministerial or 
departmental policy. Even where intervention options are not provided for in legislation, 
central government often achieves the same results through informal arrangements, for 
example, Christchurch City Council gaining a Crown observer, before the LGA permitted one. 
Such democracy-centric unifying principles may also rectify disparities in the current 
legislative regimes; for example, that partially-appointed tertiary councils must be consulted 
before intervention, but local councils need not be. There is also opportunity for greater cross-
pollination, particularly from boards of trustees’ experiences, given this regime is the most 
commonly used and thus most developed. This has already occurred on occasion, with tertiary 
education legislation inspiring the use of Crown observers for local government, but could be 
encouraged further. 
Principles such as these may be useful both in avoiding judicial review and identifying where 
cases may succeed. Applicants might argue that such principles are relevant, or mandatory, 
considerations.343 Since only the LGA specifically disclaims consultation obligations, courts 
would be free to imply natural justice requirements into the other regimes.344  Irrationality 
would inevitably be argued. Despite losing traction, the Wednesbury test’s high threshold, 
requiring something “so outrageous …that no sensible person…could have arrived at it”, 
remains influential as courts emphasise their traditional role as arbiters of process, not 
substance.345 If a right to local democracy in New Zealand could be demonstrated, the threshold 
for unreasonableness might be lowered, but this is far from clear.346 The nascent inconsistency 
or Guinness grounds may be applicable. The Guinness ground requires only a problem “of a 
nature and degree” requiring judicial intervention, although its status as a separate ground of 
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review is controversial.347 Inconsistency demands that like cases be treated alike and is, like all 
substantive grounds, treated warily by judges.348  
A Democracy  
The more democratic a body, the higher the thresholds should be for intervention as that body 
better represents the people its decisions affect than the nationally-elected minister does. Thus, 
ministers should be careful when intervening in local government. Boards of trustees are also 
fully elected and may better understand a school’s unique character than the ministry, but the 
‘donations’ they receive do not afford them the same autonomy as councils gain through rates. 
By contrast, tertiary institutions and DHBs have minister-appointed members, weakening the 
imperative to avoid intervention. However, this is not currently reflected in the statutes, 
particularly for boards of trustees versus tertiary institutions (see the two examples below). 
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Both the LGA and NZ Public Health and Disabilities Act provisions on DHBs list increasing 
democratic representation among their purposes, suggesting it may be a mandatory relevant 
consideration.349 It may also be implied into the boards of trustees regime since increasing 
community participation was key to the relevant reforms. Their democratic identities are a vital 
component of these bodies’ identities and it seems natural that ministers should have to 
consider the effects of removing them. 
A more difficult argument might be that individuals have a right to local government 
democracy, engaging the lower threshold for finding unreasonableness used in Wolf v Minister 
of Immigration. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights grants the right to 
political participation.350 However, the Bill of Rights Act 1990 contains only a right to vote in 
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  Table 3: Comparison of requirements for Crown observers and commissions 
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national elections, not local ones. The Local Electoral Act s 20 is headed the right to vote, but 
the provision itself grants only a less emotive ‘entitlement’.351 
There is thus a strong case for democracy being a mandatory relevant consideration for 
ministers. However, in the absence of an explicit right to local democracy, it is unlikely to 
result in a lower threshold for unreasonableness. 
B Subsidiarity 
The principle of subsidiarity advocates for decisions being made as locally as possible, to 
account for local conditions. Central government must support local autonomy but also refrain 
from interfering in local government affairs.352 The principle originated with Aristotle, and was 
further promulgated by the Catholic Church, which considered it an ethical obligation to avoid 
concentration of power, and economists arguing it promoted efficiency.353 It also enhances 
local participation, empowering those who will actually be affected by a decision.354 
Subsidiarity is extensively used in European Union law to prevent the collective from 
interfering in member states’ affairs.355  
New Zealand, by contrast, has not adopted the subsidiarity principle and indeed, given the 
limitations on local bodies’ powers, it may appear to have little sway.356 However, it was 
considered as a principle of local government by the Royal Commission on Auckland 
Governance, whose background papers cited statistical evidence from Italy on the greater 
efficacy of more localised government.357 The 180 submissions the Commission received on 
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the matter would suggest that, politically at the very least, ministers would be wise to remember 
that these sub-national bodies are closer to the problems they must address than central 
government is and should not be displaced lightly. 
C Scale of the problem 
Whether the problem’s scale warrants intervention should be carefully considered. Since the 
statutory thresholds for intervention are so easily met, they do not necessarily identify cases 
where ministers should intervene. Furthermore, entities’ autonomy and democratic legitimacy 
should be recognised. The more democratic the body, the more deference it warrants. 
At present, problems are treated inconsistently, particularly those involving local government 
and DHBs. ECan was appointed a commission despite trouble solely with its water consenting 
function, while Christchurch City Council’s building consent problems warranted only a 
Crown manager. Arguably, water consenting was more central to ECan’s functions than 
building consenting was to Christchurch City Council’s, but both are vital and potentially 
disastrous if done poorly. Furthermore, appointing a Crown observer to Christchurch City 
Council was questionable, since disagreements between councillors and controversy over 
salaries are normal in a democracy. The contrast between the treatment of Hawke’s Bay DHB 
and Capital & Coast is also startling. Debt was a major reason for appointing a commission 
and a Crown manager respectively, yet Capital & Coast’s debt equated to 7.4% of its annual 
budget; Hawke’s Bay’s 1.8% received a harsher response.358  
Of course, the scale of the entities concerned will impact what constitutes a problem. A $1 
million debt would mean little to a district council, would be a problem for a DHB but 
disastrous for a board of trustees. For local government, only Kaipara District Council’s $63 
million debt ($3474 per capita) has justified a commission’s appointment.359 Waitomo District 
Council’s major financial impropriety led only to an informal advisory panel. No major council 
has suffered intervention for financial impropriety, perhaps because larger budgets enable 
easier redistribution of funds. Alternatively, perhaps they can afford better advice.  
Amongst DHBs, Hawke’s Bay’s $7.7 million debt ($50 per capita) resulted in a commission, 
while debts of $47.5 million ($178 per capita), $7 million ($112 per capita) and $10 million 
($33 per capita) meant Crown monitors for Capital & Coast, Whanganui and Southern DHBs. 
Such disparities prevent discernment of any pattern from past performance and decision-
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makers risk challenges based on unreasonableness or inconsistency. More data regarding 
acceptable debt levels for schools is needed to continue this exercise. For polytechnics also, 
the matter is fraught since few use their services (whereas everyone benefits from local council 
services and DHB healthcare). However, looking at the population bases served, Northland 
Polytechnic received a Crown observer with a $3.7 million deficit ($23 per capita) for example. 
The accepted debt levels naturally decrease with the size of the entity. 
Regarding local governance issues, the Creech report’s authors expressed concern that ECan’s 
problems did not warrant intervention, despite its failure to perform RMA duties.360 Similarly, 
Rodney District Council members made meetings impossible before commissioners were 
appointed. This suggests a very high threshold for intervention, despite any significant problem 
impairing local government meeting current thresholds.361 David Cunliffe required little 
evidence of governance concerns before dismissing Hawke’s Bay DHB, citing only poor 
relations with himself and criticism by two clinicians. This is in contrast to the serious 
governance issues that led to commissions being appointed in the board of trustees examples 
considered. Isla Bank School Board of Trustees was dismissed after all but two members had 
resigned, Makoura College’s board wanted the school shut down against the community’s 
wishes and Moerewa School’s board continued running NCEA level classes despite being told 
to desist. Thus, DHBs would appear to be the aberration here. 
Management and governance issues should be distinguished, management being day-to-day 
operations below board level while governance involves board-level strategic planning.362 
Management issues will likely arise through actions of the board’s appointed subordinates. 
Since these individuals do not have the same democratic legitimacy as the board, intervention 
should arguably require less prompting. However, since the board is only indirectly 
accountable, such issues should rarely justify its dismissal. Christchurch City Council’s losing 
consenting accreditation and being appointed a Crown manager appears to be one end of the 
management spectrum. For governance, the board is directly responsible but caution is needed 
since it is performing functions granted it by voters. 
It is suggested that interventions involving ministerial appointees actively influencing decision-
making (Crown observer upwards) should be limited to situations where a body’s failings are 
negatively affecting individuals outside of the electorate which voted for them, although 
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‘negatively affecting’ could be interpreted broadly. Local government problems should be 
nationally important to justify intervention as leaving national issues to central government and 
local issues to local representatives partially alleviates democratic concerns. ECan’s troubles 
would meet this test, since Canterbury contains 70% of New Zealand’s fresh water, as would 
Kaipara District Council’s, since a $63 million debt the council cannot service threatens the 
national purse. Rodney District Council’s inability to hold civilised meetings might be a 
national issue, bringing local government generally into disrepute. Such a test, although a 
somewhat inexact standard, ensures more consistent, rational and proportionate responses to 
issues and eliminates situations where interventions are wholly inappropriate. However, it 
might leave bigger councils, which act on a larger scale, more prone to intervention, allowing 
the Minister to obtain their powers by proxy, creating a new democratic concern. 
For boards of trustees, the minister should contemplate active intervention where the wider 
community is negatively impacted. This might be due to the school racking up significant debt 
which it cannot pay or major communication breakdowns with the community. Anything 
harming student welfare could also be said to be impacting their community’s wellbeing so 
there would be no fear of major harm to students going unaddressed. 
However, for DHBs and tertiary institutions, it should be remembered when this standard is 
applied that ministerial appointees make up a significant part of these boards and decisions 
they influence should not be confused with those coming from the people. 
D Importance/centrality of the function 
The importance of the function at issue may legitimise central government intervention. DHBs 
allocate healthcare resources, boards of trustees manage primary and secondary education. 
Both are vital; they were traditionally central government functions, whereas building 
consenting, issuing water permits, and tertiary education were not. Thus, central government 
might better justify intervening in DHBs and boards of trustees. Subsidiary functions these 
bodies perform, such as employment and budget management, might be less likely to legitimise 
government action. 
Alternatively, subnational representatives are elected primarily for their views on healthcare, 
education, local government etc., not necessarily financial skills. Therefore, central 
government should avoid issues central to the community’s choices when it voted, and instead 
provide support on matters outside representatives’ expertise. Thus, arguments under this 
principle are finely balanced and may depend on the particular circumstances. 
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E Timing 
Timing issues operate in various ways. If problems have existed for a prolonged period, it 
might justify greater intervention. If matters are escalating quickly, the minister must decide 
whether to act rapidly and thus undermine democratic legitimacy by skipping consultation.  
Ministers should also consider how long the body has been in office. A major issue with David 
Cunliffe’s approach to the Hawke’s Bay DHB was that it had been in office only seven months. 
Cunliffe argued that many representatives had been there since 2001; however, ministers 
should be wary of removing boards without affording them sufficient time to address problems 
they have inherited. 
F Complexity 
A situation’s complexity may operate against democracy. Democratic representation seeks to 
involve a community voice in important, broad-reaching decisions. However, this often means 
electing ordinary people based on their ability to represent constituents. While this is fine for 
setting high level aspirations, elected representatives may be ill-equipped to address any 
complex technical issues. This perhaps justifies DHBs and tertiary councils having ministerial 
appointees; however, local government and boards of trustees may face similar problems. The 
teaching profession has expressed concern that trustees are struggling with the technical 
requirements of the role.363 
Thus, a minister contemplating intervention should examine whether the particular problem is 
within the abilities of elected, non-specialist representatives to resolve, or whether it requires 
specialist attention. If the latter, specialist assistance mechanisms like Crown observers might 
be preferable initially. 
G Evidence/Transparency 
All local government interventions, bar Christchurch’s Crown observer, have been prefaced by 
a report into the problems, even when not statutorily required. This requirement was removed 
in 2012, and indeed, urgency may sometimes obviate a report (although the Creech report on 
ECan took only four weeks). However, where possible, a thorough report is surely prudent. 
Given the severe criticism the Creech report faced for authors’ connections to the dairy 
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industry, a major recipient of ECan’s water permits, an independent report, for example from 
the Auditor-General, is advisable.364  
The other regimes examined do not mandate reports before interventions either, but again, a 
report could improve the process’ transparency.365 The Ministry of Education’s documentation 
regarding board of trustees interventions suggest that they will always complete a report 
assessing risks before deciding to intervene, and will consult ERO reports. For DHBs, a report 
by the Director-General of Health had been completed into Hawke’s Bay DHB’s alleged 
management issues but Health Minister David Cunliffe did not utilise it in deciding to dismiss 
the board as it was subject to an injunction. However, he could easily have waited at least to 
see whether the injunction could be successfully appealed. Intervention in Whanganui DHB 
took place after a scathing report. 
Thus, the practice of requiring a full report on the situation before intervention is widespread 
but not universal and may go a long way towards convincing a court (and the voting public) 
that an intervention is necessary. However, decision-makers need to be aware that once 
completed, a report’s findings might become mandatory relevant considerations.  
H Consultation 
Under the local government, DHB and board of trustees regimes, the Minister need not consult 
anyone, including affected bodies, before intervening, although he/she must give notice. Such 
an obligation only exists for tertiary institutions, where the Minister must consult the council 
and give it an opportunity to respond before acting. Yet consultation may partially alleviate 
democratic concerns and the Ministry of Education has found that involving boards of trustees 
early ensures they work cooperatively with appointees during the intervention. Furthermore, 
all previous local government interventions, aside from ECan’s, gained councils’ consent 
following significant consultation. At the very least, consultation lends credibility to ministerial 
actions. Consultation directly with the public, with other entities such as Local Government 
New Zealand (previously a requirement) or the local MP would also be advisable. Consultation 
also reduces the risk of overlooking any errors of fact. 
Any appointees replacing elected officials should also undertake consultation, usually a 
requirement of their terms of reference. In Kaipara and Canterbury, this is reportedly going 
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well and is an important legitimising factor.366 A community advisory group is recommended 
by the Ministry of Education where a commission takes over a school board and is a 
requirement of a commissioner entering a tertiary institute. 
I Bipartisan support/ Apolitical decision-making 
While political decision-making is inherent in being a minister, ministers exercising 
intervention powers risk challenge on grounds of pre-determination of an issue, bias or 
improper purpose if they remove elected bodies, for example, due to a clash of ideologies. 
These latter two grounds were to be argued in the judicial review of David Cunliffe’s decision 
to remove the Hawke’s Bay DHB and the available evidence (and inconsistency with other 
actions against DHBs) suggests he may have wished to act against those criticising him. Some 
commentators have argued the same regarding ECan, as National sought to evict a council 
prioritising environmental protection over development.367 The appointment of political allies 
to key roles on review teams and commissions may also be symptomatic. Thus, while Boddy 
notes increasingly legalistic relations between central and local government in the UK, in New 
Zealand politics is making its presence felt.368 This should be discouraged, since the majority 
of these boards have been democratically elected, so their members should not be removed 
lightly. 
A good way of demonstrating that decisions are not improperly politically motivated is for 
them to receive cross-party support. The Rodney, Canterbury and Kaipara interventions 
required special legislation; statutes for Kaipara and Rodney passed virtually unanimously 
(Kaipara’s by 112 to 9). For Rodney, then-Local Government Minister Sandra Lee (Labour) 
also consulted the electorate’s National party representative in preparing the Bill.369 ECan’s 
was far more controversial. While two out of three statutes is insufficient to confirm a trend, 
bipartisan support would circumvent many democratic and constitutional concerns about 
interfering in local government and protect against minor interventions. The public might 
object to all an area’s local representatives being ousted on a Minister’s whim, or even by 51% 
of national representatives. However, close to 100% of national representatives overriding 
100% of local representatives appears somewhat more palatable. 
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Boards of trustees are entirely democratically elected and so the same issues might arise around 
national representatives telling 100% of local representatives how to act. However, it would be 
impractical to determine formally whether there is cross-party support for the appointment of 
a commission as they happen reasonably frequently. That said, the opposition will undoubtedly 
make known their concerns if they oppose a move (as seen with Moerewa School and Te Kura 
Kaupapa Maori o Whangaroa which appeared frequently at Question Time) or offer ardent 
support for a commission’s appointment (as the local National MP voiced when Makoura 
College was threatened with closure). 
Tellingly, David Cunliffe’s decision to sack the Hawke’s Bay DHB generated a parliamentary 
debate and was roundly criticised by all opposition parties. DHBs are subject to far more 
government control than the other sub-national bodies examined so there may be less of a need 
for cross-party support. 
J Minimising interventions 
The LGA states specifically that commissioners should not be appointed where another option 
would be effective. A court might find this a sensible relevant, or even mandatory, 
consideration for other interventions also (although its specific inclusion for the commission 
provisions may mean its implicit exclusion in others). It is already a strict requirement of the 
intervention regime for boards of trustees and this might be an example of beneficial cross-
pollination. To act otherwise would unnecessarily reduce local democracy and financially 
burden ratepayers. Only for ECan and Hawke’s Bay DHB might this previously have been 
problematic. Only ECan’s water consent processes were flawed and these powers alone could 
have been vested elsewhere. ECan’s functions were once distributed amongst 33 different 
bodies; they could be partially separated again.370 Judging from other similar cases, a more 
appropriate approach for Hawke’s Bay would have been to appoint a Crown monitor. 
As part of minimising intervention, ministers need also be aware of the other mechanisms 
available for holding these bodies accountable. Ministerial intervention should not take place 
where an investigation by an independent body such as the Ombudsman or Auditor-General 
would suffice and better uphold principles of democracy and avoid centralisation of power. 
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K Summary 
This part has suggested a range of principles for decision-makers to consider regarding 
ministerial interventions, aimed at protecting both democracy and communities from poorly 
operating sub-national bodies. Such principles should be applied relative to the body’s 
democratic mandate and incorporate matters specific to the situation at hand like the scale of 
the issue; the function in question including its importance and complexity, and of general 
application, for example, transparency and consultation. 
VII Conclusions 
Subnational democratic bodies fulfil important roles in public welfare, healthcare and 
education. Partially or entirely elected, they localise decision-making. However, ministerial 
intervention powers threaten this, their high levels of discretion encouraging replacement of 
local bodies with ministerial appointees. 
Part II examined increased discretion in the local government intervention regime since the 
Local Government Act’s 2012 amendments, and the increasing prevalence of interventions. 
These have deprived communities of a more direct form of democracy and risk concentrating 
powers with the minister.  
Confusion over local government’s constitutional position has perhaps encouraged 
encroachment on its powers. Local government is sometimes described as a “partner” in “a 
constitutional relationship” and represents an important check on central government.371 
However, unlike many states, New Zealand grants it no constitutional protection, despite the 
LGA arguably being one of our most important statutes.372 Furthermore, Part II’s case studies 
suggest local government exists very much at central government’s whim. The Constitutional 
Advisory Panel has recommended “further conversation” on the central-local government 
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relationship, to determine whether local government requires clear constitutional 
recognition.373 Hopefully, this prompts further research in the area. 
While local authorities and DHBs are often uttered in the same breath (and in some regions, 
comprise the same people), they are very different creatures.374 DHBs’ appointed members 
undermine their democratic legitimacy, as do the Minister’s significant powers of oversight. 
This perhaps explains their very minimal thresholds for intervention. Whether this will change 
and healthcare functions become increasingly localised is open to speculation.375 
Parts IV and V examined the very different arrangements for secondary and tertiary educational 
institutions. School boards of trustees take subsidiarity to the extreme, with decisions made at 
an institutional level. The Minister’s discretion to intervene is even greater than for DHBs and 
local authorities, but Ministry policies ensure the system is used sparingly and effectively. 
Cross-pollination with other regimes is thus to be encouraged.  
Tertiary institutions offer another comparator, although their intervention regime is rarely used 
and the different arrangements for polytechnics add unneeded complexity. Its greatest effect 
so far has been to inspire the Crown observer option for local government. 
Having considered these four regimes’ successes and difficulties, this paper advocated a set of 
principles to encourage better use of ministerial interventions. These are: 
 Democracy 
 Subsidiarity 
 Scale of the problem 
 Importance/centrality of the function 
 Timing 
 Complexity 
 Evidence/Transparency 
 Consultation 
 Bipartisan support/Apolitical decision-making 
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 Minimising interventions 
Such principles might inform use of intervention powers beforehand, or allow retrospective 
analysis, through judicial review or otherwise. Alternatively, they may usefully clarify current 
legislation, through inclusion as mandatory considerations for decision-makers. 
New Zealand’s democratic subnational bodies are diverse, as are the accountability regimes 
which keep them in line. Ministers retain considerable influence over elected representatives, 
and are increasingly using it. This paper has thus promoted a set of principles to better 
harmonise these regimes and increase their utility as accountability mechanisms while limiting 
concentration of power with ministers. Without formal recognition of subnational democracy 
in our constitutional system, little else can be done. 
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